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Abstract
This paper analyses the link between discretionary fiscal policy and output growth in ten CEE
countries. Three aspects are considered: cyclical pattern in the fiscal discretion, contributions to
GDP growth, and the link between policy aggressiveness and output volatility. Fiscal discretion
is estimated from quarterly data over 2000q1 to 2014q1 using a SVAR model in GDP, net taxes
and spending. Decomposition of the GDP suggests that fiscal discretion induced rather small
contributions to economic growth. Correlation between fiscal policy aggressiveness and output
volatility is weak to moderate positive, notwithstanding whether spending or balance is used as
the underlying indicator. The cyclical pattern has identified a mix of pro- and counter-cyclical
episodes in the years before the crisis, implying that governments might not have consistently
used the good times to create buffers. Overall, this evidence supports the view that policy makers
in the CEE countries should mainly rely on rule-based fiscal policy rather than (aggressive) fiscal
discretion.
JEL: C32, E32, E61, E62
Keywords: discretionary fiscal policy, cyclicality of fiscal policy, fiscal policy aggressiveness, GDP
growth, output volatility, SVAR model
1 Introduction
The literature generally favours the use of rule-based fiscal policy to policy discretion. The major
argument to back that view is that aggressive use of fiscal discretion aggravates business cycle
volatility (e.g. Fatas and Mihov, 2003; Afonso et al. , 2010; and Badinger, 2009). The recommen-
dation of rule-based policy is especially relevant for emerging economies, among which also the
new EU members, as they are more prone to volatility in fiscal discretion (cf. Darvas and Kostyleva,
2011; Afonso and Jalles, 2013; and Kabashi, 2014).
With the Great Recession 2008-09, however, there prevailed appeal that fiscal policy should be
used to counteract the downturn, as if there was a broad agreement about its effects (cf. Ilzetzki et
al. , 2013). The stimuli implemented by the governments, along with the operation of automatic
stabilisers, left the budget balances of the Central and East European (CEE) countries weaker than
before the crisis (e.g. IMF, 2009; Darvas, 2010; and Staehr, 2010). As a result, the room for future
fiscal maneuver has considerably reduced (OeNB, 2012).
In spite of the urgency that reigned after the onset of the crisis, the available literature has
barely justified the view that fiscal measures could be an effective stabilisation tool in the former
transition countries. At present, consistent evidence on the extent to what fiscal discretion in the
CEE countries affects the GDP growth and its volatility, seems to be lacking.
With the aim to fill that gap, this paper analyses fiscal discretion and output growth in ten CEE
countries (henceforth CEE-10) using quarterly data over 2000q1 to 2014q1. The paper i) estimates
fiscal discretion from a SVAR model in real GDP, net taxes and government spending, ii) constructs
measures of structural balance and of fiscal policy aggressiveness, iii) maps the cyclical pattern
in the discretionary policy, iv) estimates contributions of fiscal discretion to GDP growth, and iv)
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estimates correlation between the fiscal policy aggressiveness and output volatility. Decomposition
of the GDP suggests that fiscal discretion induced rather small contributions to economic growth.
Correlation between fiscal policy aggressiveness and output volatility is weak to moderate positive,
notwithstanding whether spending or balance is used as the underlying indicator. The cyclical
pattern has identified a mix of pro- and counter-cyclical episodes in the years before the crisis,
implying that governments might not have consistently used the good times to create buffers.
The next section summarises the previous research on fiscal discretion in the CEE countries and
lists studies that provide methodological reference for this analysis. Section 3 derives a set of fiscal
and business cycle indicators and discusses estimation and data related issues. Section 4 presents
the empirical results and discusses their robustness to VAR identification method and alternative
methodology. The final section draws concluding remarks and suggests further extensions of this
work.
2 Previous research
Research on fiscal policy in the former transition countries is comparatively less extensive than for
the advanced economies. The previous literature that tackled various aspects of discretionary fiscal
policy in the CEE-10 can be characterised as follows:q At present, evidence on the relationship between policy aggressiveness and output volatility
seems to be lacking. The key studies, such as that of Fatas and Mihov (2003), included emerging
economies, but not those from Europe. A piece of preliminary evidence for the CEE-10 is pro-
vided by Staehr (2008) who estimated the relationship between autonomous fiscal policy and
variability in private sector output growth from annual data over 1995 to 2005.q A growing body of empirical literature estimated the effects of fiscal shocks in the form of impulse
response functions using vector autoregressive models. An example of a recent study for seven
CEE countries is due to Dinu (2014).q Relatively numerous papers analyse cyclical properties of fiscal discretion in one or more CEE
countries, using estimates of the so-called cyclically-adjusted budget balances. Some authors
make direct use of data disseminated by international institutions (e.g. Eller, 2009, for the CEE-
10; Mencinger and Aristovnik, 2014, for Slovenia and Euro Area Countries; and Kabashi, 2014,
for the CEE-10 and six South Eastern transition countries), or follow in their own calculation
the standard methodology (e.g. Grundiza et al. , 2005, for Latvia; Dumitru and Stanca, 2010, for
Romania). Other authors propose their own measure of a cyclically-adjusted balance or fiscal
stance (e.g. Lewis, 2007, for eight CEE countries; Altar et al. , 2010, for Romania; Ambrisko et
al. , 2012, for the Czech republic; and Marcanova and Odor, 2014, for Slovakia). Mirdala (2013)
computed cyclically-adjusted balances for the CEE-10 using a VEC as the underlying model.
Lewis (2013) assessed cyclicality of the fiscal policy in CEE-10 using real-time fiscal data.
To mention some of the findings that are interesting for the analysis in this paper, fiscal shocks
in the CEE countries seem to yield rather small-sized effects on output (Dinu, 2014); the relation-
ship between autonomous fiscal policy and private sector output variability is positive and more
significant for the CEE-10 than for the Western EU countries (Staehr, 2008); several papers bring
on the issue of pro-cyclical policy stance (cf. e.g. Eller, 2009; Dumitru and Stanca, 2010; Ambrisko
et al. , 2012; and Kabashi, 2014); some authors point out that the cylical pattern might be in part
driven by the estimates of potential output (e.g. Eller, 2009), or that results from real-time data
would acquit policymakers of the charges of running pro-cyclical fiscal policy (e.g. Lewis, 2013).
This paper aims to deepen the knowledge about the stabilisation potential of discretionary fiscal
policy in the CEE-10. To that end, the paper explicitly quantifies contributions of discretionary
policy to GDP growth and estimates the relationship between policy aggressiveness and output
volatility. The analysis is backed by two sorts of references:q Estimation of discretionary fiscal policy using a SVAR approach refers to the paper of Blanchard
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and Perotti (2002). The authors specified a vector autoreggressive model with quarterly dis-
tributed lags in tax receipts, government spending and output. They introduced an exogenously
estimated scheme to identify structural fiscal shocks based on a detailed knowledge of the U.S.
tax code. Afonso and Claeys (2008) show that estimated VAR structural shocks can be used
to gauge an indicator of structural budget balance as an alternative to the cyclically-adjusted
balances.q Analysis of the relationship between aggressive use of fiscal discretion and output volatility refers
to the study of Fatas and Mihov (2003). The authors construct a measure of policy aggressiveness
as the standard deviation in the regression residual of government spending. More recent appli-
cation of the aggressiveness concept are due to e.g. Badinger (2009) and Afonso et al. (2010).
The evidence in those studies, based on large sets of advanced and developing economies, sug-
gests that higher output volatility is associated with a more volatile use of fiscal discretion.
3 Methodological background
This section sets forth a framework to estimate fiscal discretion and derives a set of fiscal policy
and business cycle indicators.
In tables, countries are henceforth labeled using the following two-letter country codes: BG
Bulgaria, CZ Czech republic, EE Estonia, LV Latvia, LT Lithuania, HU Hungary, PL Poland, RO
Romania, SI Slovenia, and SK Slovakia.
3.1 Fiscal policy indicators
Discretionary fiscal policy refers to those changes in the policy that are not an automatic reaction of
the budget to the business cycle. The overall budget balance includes automatic stabilizers that are
incorporated in the legislation and act without intervention of the policymakers. Thus by removing
the cyclical effect of the stabilisers, the remaining "cyclically-adjusted" balance is a truer picture of
the underlying stance of the policy.
This paper estimates individually for each of the CEE-10 the discretionary component in net
taxes and government spending. It borrows from the standard macroeconomic literature the SVAR
approach, proposed originally by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The choice of the variables reflects
the aim to track policy channels that are most closely associated with aggregate demand and,
through aggregate demand, with output. Examples of studies that estimated fiscal discretion using
vector autoregressive models include Afonso and Claeys (2008) or Caldara and Kamps (2008).
The choice has a number of advantages:q The VAR methodology conceptually matches the fiscal policy theory, in which it is thought about
fiscal policy as consisting of two components, the rule-based policy and discretion (cf. Mourre
et al. 2013). The rule-based policy (in practice often termed as automatic stabilisers or cyclical
component) is represented by the model and discretion is estimated using the VAR structural
shocks.q The vector autoregressive model takes care of the endogeneity problem, which is important
for the estimates of policy aggressiveness. In large cross-section studies as that of Fatas and
Mihov (2003), the problem is overcome by dynamic panel data estimation techniques. The VAR
methodology provides a possible alternative in cases the number of cross-sections is small.q The multivariate analysis enables to estimate in a consistent way the discretionary and cyclical
component both on the expenditure and revenue side of the budget, rather than focusing just on
government spending.q Given that the GDP is a part of the model, this approach does not rely on external estimates
of the potential output and output gap. As such, it is not subject to drawbacks that are related
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to the calculation of cyclically-adjusted budget balances (cf. e.g. Hughes Hallet et al. , 2012, or
Reiss, 2013).
3.1.1 VAR specification
The empirical model of fiscal policy as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) may, ignoring for
ease of notation any exogenous terms, be written in the reduced form as:
A(L)Xt = Ut (1)
where A(L) represents a matrix of lag polynomials in the lag operator L, Xt is a vector of endoge-
nous variables and Ut is the vector of reduced form residuals. The vector Xt includes the logarithms
of government net taxes Tt, government spending Gt and output Yt, all in real terms. As exoge-
nous variables, the model includes the unemployment rate, annual change in the real effective
exchange rate and GDP deflator, and lagged value of real government debt. The specification also
includes deterministic terms and dummy variables.
The VAR coefficients were estimated using the standard multivariate least squares estimator.
The specification was tested for stability and appropriate lag length and the estimated residuals
were submitted to tests for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and normality. In the end, a levels
VAR model was estimated for each of the countries in 3 (Czech republic and Slovenia) or 2 lags
(other countries). For each of the countries, the specification also includes a constant and a linear
trend. The following dummies were included: 2003q1 for the Czech republic, 2008q1 to 2008q4
for Bulgaria, 2008q2 to 2008q3 for Romania and 2007q4 to 2008q4 for Slovakia.
3.1.2 Identification of structural shocks
The reduced form residuals uTt , u
G
t , and u
Y
t have in general non-zero cross-correlations. To uncover
unobserved structural shocks Tt , 
G
t and 
Y
t that are mutually uncorrelated, identification proceeds
alongside two schemes:
1. A recursive identification that uses the lower Choleski factor of the residuals’ variance-covariance
matrix. The recursive scheme requires a causal ordering of the model variables. Government
spending is ordered first, followed by the GDP and net taxes (cf. e.g. Caldara and Kamps, 2008).
2. An identification approach adapted from Blanchard and Perotti (2002), based on elasticities of
the fiscal variables w.r.t. output1.
The latter approach relies on institutional information about the tax and transfer system. The
idea is to identify automatic responses of net taxes and spending to economic activity. Essential to
the scheme is using quarterly data. The relationship between the reduced-form residuals and the
structural disturbances reads as:⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 −α
0 1 −β−a31 −a32 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
uTt
uGt
uYt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
b11 b12 0
b21 b22 0
0 0 b33
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Tt
Gt
Yt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (2)
The left hand side matrix in (2) captures the unexpected movements in the three endogenous
variables to affect each other, whilst the right hand side matrix isolates the mutual effects of the
structural shocks. Thus for instance the fiscal revenue shock Tt is obtained from the reduced form
residual uTt after subtracting the responses to unexpected movements in GDP α ⋅ uYt and to fiscal
expenditure shocks b12 ⋅ Gt .
Estimation of the two matrices proceeds in the following steps:
1 Another interesting identification strategy could be the long-run restrictions as do e.g. Afonso and Claeys (2008).
However, the possibility to use this approach for the CEE-10 is limited given the relatively small number of observations
and therefore it is avoided in this paper.
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q Parameters α and β denote elasticities to output of net taxes and spending, respectively. To
obtain α, elasticities of the individual taxes and transfers w.r.t. output are weighted by their
shares in net taxes. Given that transfers are netted out from spending, there are little reasons to
think that government spending would automatically respond to GDP within a quarter; β is set
zero.q With the estimated α and β, cyclically-adjusted reduced form residuals in net taxes and spending
are constructed, u˜Tt = uTt − α ⋅ uYt and u˜Gt = uGt − β ⋅ uYt . Whilst u˜Tt and u˜Gt may still be correlated
with each other, they are no longer correlated with Yt , and thus can be used as instruments to
estimate a31 and a32 in a regression of uYt on u
T
t and u
G
t .q In a last step, the right hand side coefficients are estimated, b12 and b21, in a regression of the
cyclically adjusted residuals on each other. It is difficult to decide whether net taxes respond
to spending (b21 = 0) or the reverse (b12 = 0), when the government increases spending and
taxes at the same time. The correlation between u˜Tt and u˜
G
t turns out to be very small, thus the
ordering makes little difference. The assumption is adopted that b12 = 0. The elements on the
main diagonal of the right hand side matrix are the standard deviations of the structural shocks.
Table 1 reports elasticities of net taxes to output, obtained in a one-step calculation. The loga-
rithm of each of the taxes and transfers was regressed against the logarithm of GDP. The inflation
rate was used as an instrumental variable. Instrumenting for the inflation appeared important in
order to obtain unbiased estimates of the slope coefficients, especially in the case of social benefits
and subsidies. The resulting elasticities range from 0.7 to about 0.8, which is close to the estimates
in the empirical literature (cf. e.g. Girouard and Andre, 2005, Eller et al. , 2011).
Table 1: Elasticities of net taxes to output
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK
Direct taxes 0.66 0.75 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.69
Indirect taxes 0.78 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.78 0.75
Social contributions 0.71 0.81 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.78 0.77
Social benefits 0.75 0.82 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.76 0.80 0.79
Subsidies 0.44 0.60 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.53
Net taxes . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.3 Construction of fiscal indicators
Using the estimates of the VAR structural shocks, various fiscal policy indicators are constructed as
follows:q Discretionary fiscal policy, henceforth also structural balance, is the difference between the struc-
tural shocks to net taxes and spending, BALt = Tt − Gt . To be clear about the signs, a positive
balance is surplus, and a positive change in the structural balance means fiscal tightening.q Rule-based policy are those parts of net taxes and spending which were found to respond auto-
matically to economic activity, Tt − Tt and Gt − Gt .q Two alternative measures of fiscal policy aggressiveness are used: the standard deviation of the
discretionary spending, σG (used e.g. by Fatas and Mihov, 2003), and the standard deviation of
the structural balance, σBAL .
3.2 Business cycle indicators
The business cycle is characterised using the following indicators:q Output volatility σY is the standard deviation of output growth (cf. Fatas and Mihov, 2003).q To obtain trend and output gap, seasonally adjusted real GDP is smoothed using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 1600.
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The estimated trend GDP shall serve as the reference basis to express structural fiscal indicators
in GDP percentages.
The output gap estimates, along with the overall GDP growth rates, are used to isolate peri-
ods of extreme cyclical conditions. There are good reasons to believe that in periods when the
economies were severely depressed or overheated, volatility in the fiscal discretion was a reac-
tion to volatility in output in a first place. The resulting classification of the cyclical conditions
is reported in Table 2. The CEE-10 experienced overheating between 2006 and 2008, and deep
contraction in the two years to follow. In addition, periods between the two extremes are isolated
so as to filter out times when the cycle turned. About 8 to 10 years remain that can be viewed as
the usual business cycle.
As for Poland, two years fall below the 20th percentile, 2002 and 2013, with an average annual
growth rate of 1.5 percent. Even though the figures were not negative, the two years were associ-
ated with high unemployment and as such they do qualify for a possible response of discretionary
fiscal policy. For this reason, the two years also were cautiously classified as contractions rather
than normal cyclical conditions.
Table 2: Cyclical condition in the CEE-10
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK
2001 n n n n n n n n n n
2002 n n n n n n - n n n
2003 n n n n n n n n n n
2004 n n n n n n n n n n
2005 n n n n n + n n n n
2006 + + + + + + n + n n
2007 + + b + + b + + + +
2008 b b b b b b + + b +
2009 - - - - - - n b - -
2010 - n n n - n n - n n
2011 n n n n n n n n n n
2012 n n n n n n n n n n
2013 n n n n n n - n n n
Normal times 8 9 9 9 8 8 9 8 10 10
Contraction 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
Overheating 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2
Between 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 0
Note: As contraction and overheating periods are classified when both the output gap and the GDP growth
rate were below and above the 20th and 70th percentile of their respective distributions since 2001. Abbrevi-
ations used: "n" normal times, "+" overheating, "-" contraction, "b" year between episodes of extreme cyclical
condition.
3.3 Data
For each of the CEE-10, the data set used for the VAR estimation consists of quarterly data over
2000q1 to 2014q1. The data were drawn from the Eurostat database of the European Commis-
sion (Spring 2015). The series are coded as follows: Yt is the gross domestic product at market
prices (B1GM), which was also used to filter out the trend and output gap; Tt is the sum of direct
taxes (D5), indirect taxes (D2) and social contributions (D611) minus social benefits (D62, D6311,
D63121, D63131) and subsidies (D3); Gt is the sum of public wages (D1), government consump-
tion (P2) and investment (P51). The exogenous variables are the unemployment rate (UNERT),
real effective exchange rate to 37 trading partners (REER37CPI), the GDP price deflator (CPI05)
and the government consolidated gross debt (GD). The fiscal variables and GDP were deflated by
6
the GDP price deflator and seasonally adjusted.
For comparison, cyclically-adjusted balances that are used for the so-called Excessive deficit
procedure were drawn from the AMECO database of the European Commission (Spring 2015). The
series is coded as cyclically adjusted net lending or borrowing based on potential GDP (UBLGAP).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic results
Table 3 reports average annual growth rates in the CEE-10 since 2001. The ten economies have
enjoyed average annual growth rates between about 2 and 6 percent. In the years of overheating,
the growth accelerated to about 4 to 10 percent per year. The Great Recession caused a sharp
decline in the GDP, particularly in the Baltic states. The crisis revealed the vulnerability of these
countries which have maintained tight financial linkages with foreign trading partners and some-
what oversized housing sectors. An exception among the new EU members is Poland, which is
the only economy not to have undergone a recession since 2001. An important role in the growth
success of the Polish economy have played public investment and effective use of the EU funds
(e.g. Rae, 2013).
Table 3: GDP growth rates (% y-o-y)
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK CEE-10
Normal times 3.8 2.5 6.0 5.8 6.4 2.2 3.9 4.1 2.1 4.4 4.1
Contraction -2.6 -4.5 -14.0 -17.8 -6.7 -6.8 1.5 -1.2 -7.9 -4.9 -6.5
Overheating 6.5 6.4 10.2 10.6 8.8 3.9 6.0 7.3 7.0 8.2 7.5
Note: Source of data is the Eurostat. Own calculation.
Turning to fiscal policy indicators, Figure 1 shows country-specific estimates of structural bal-
ances and the median computed for the CEE-10. Table 4 reports the structural balances. To get
an idea how the estimates compare to headline fiscal data, the table also includes government
primary balances and balances in the net taxes and spending. The bottom row of the table reports
cyclically adjusted balances (CAB) calculated by the European Commission. The CAB indicates
what budget balance would prevail if the economy was at its potential2.
Table 4: Estimated structural balances
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK CEE-10
Structural balance
Recursive -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
Elasticity-based 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Primary balance 1.20 -2.58 0.60 -1.66 -1.84 -0.52 -2.12 -1.86 -2.32 -2.38 -1.35
Net taxes - spending -4.73 -3.76 -3.44 -3.96 -4.89 -3.23 -5.31 -4.31 -4.24 -3.95 -4.18
CAB (Commission) -0.51 -3.99 n.a. -2.72 n.a. -5.58 n.a. -4.00 -4.24 -4.44 -3.64
Note: Reported are fiscal data in % trend GDP. The CAB are from the European Commission, in % potential
output. For Estonia and Poland, the CAB were available only from 2010 to 2013, for Lithuania from 2004 to
2013.
2 The structural balances are expressed in percent of trend GDP, the CAB are disseminated in percent of potential
output. This should have little effect on the interpretation.
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Figure 1: Structural balance BAL (% trend GDP)
The estimated structural balances are very small and centered around zero, implying that
the average figures are below 0.01 percent of the trend GDP. To compare the two identification
schemes, the respective estimates are similar in the sense that they are medium to strongly posi-
tively correlated with each other and weakly to medium positively correlated with the CAB. The
recursive identification yields somewhat larger figures for BAL, the ratios of which to trend GDP
are nicely proportional across the countries and over time. The elasticity-based approach yields
figures of a rather implausibly small magnitude and seems to be more prone to generation of
outliers. Henceforth, results obtained under the recursive scheme are presented, unless indicated
otherwise.
In line with what is expected, estimates of BAL are considerably smaller than the CAB. This is
explained by a number of differences behind the two methodologies. The CAB are calculated from
fiscal data as such, whereas BAL are estimated from the VAR residuals which make to a very small
share of the variables. In the CAB calculation, the fiscal variables and output gaps do not interact
with each other, whereas this is the case in the SVAR model-based estimation. Another difference
is that the CAB are derived from the overall government balances, whilst BAL are based on net
taxes and spending. The SVAR-based estimates might thus omit some budget items, that actually
affect the CAB, such as interest payments or capital transfers. That being said, the estimates of
structural balances presented herein are a complement rather than a fully-fledged alternative to
the CAB.
4.2 Some stylised facts about fiscal discretion and GDP growth
Using the estimates of discretionary spending and balance, this section establishes some stylised
facts about fiscal discretion and GDP growth in the CEE-10.
First, cyclical pattern in the discretionary policy is identified, using annual differences in the
structural balance (Table 5). Gray background indicates when the discretion was counter-cyclical.
Basically, this includes two situations, a positive change in the structural balance against the back-
ground of a positive GDP growth (counter-cyclical tightening) and vice versa (counter-cyclical
easing). The cyclical pattern that emerges is somewhat sensitive to the identification scheme. Es-
timates under either of the schemes imply that episodes of pro- or counter-cyclical stance would
be short to medium, lasting in the most cases for two consecutive years. To break it down fur-
ther, in the good times before the crisis, shortly lasting pro- and counter-cyclical episodes could be
identified in each of the countries. At the business cycle peak in 2007, structural balances would
tighten in all CEE-10. The fiscal stance is found to have eased in the years of downturn, which is
correct given the anti-crisis measures adopted in most of the countries (refer to e.g. Darvas, 2010,
for a survey). In 2011, the structural balances have, according to the estimates, again tightened
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in all ten countries. In the first case, buoyant economic conditions provided sufficient room for a
fiscal restriction. The latter improvement in the structural balances is found in a context of general
consolidation pressures, given the deteriorated debt outlooks (cf. e.g. MFCR, 2012; MoFSR, 2012;
and Guerson, 2013).
Table 5: Cyclical properties of fiscal discretion
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK
2002 - - - - - - + - + +
2003 + + + + + + - + - +
2004 - + + + - - - - - -
2005 - - - - + - + + + +
2006 + + - - - - - - - -
2007 + + + + + + + + + +
2008 - - - - + + - - - -
2009 + - + + - - - + + -
2010 - - - + - - - + - +
2011 + + + + + + + + + +
2012 - + - - + + + - + -
2013 - - - + - + - - - +
Note: Reported are signs of the annual change in the structural balance. Symbols used: "+" fiscal tightening,
"-" fiscal easing. Gray background indicates when the fiscal stance was counter-cylical.
Table 8 in the Appendix reports average annual change in the CAB in a break-down by business
cycle condition. The CAB changes, being in most of the countries positive during contraction and
negative during overheating, would suggest a tendency to pro-cyclicality. The changes computed
from the SVAR-based estimates do not seem to support that view. Turning to estimates in the
literature, the results imply neither strong similarity nor dissonance. Examples of countries, for
which cyclical profile herein considerably agrees with the previous literature, include Hungary
(fiscal tightening in 2003, 2007-09, and 2011, cf. Mirdala, 2003); Slovakia (restriction in 2003
and subsequent easing in 2004 and 2006, tightening in 2010-11, cf. Marcanova and Odor, 2014);
Czech republic (easing in 2008-09 and tightening toward 2011, cf. Ambrisko et al. , 2012); and
Estonia and Latvia (restriction in 2003-04, cf. Mirdala, 2013).
Second, contributions of fiscal discretion to GDP growth are computed (Table 6). As a general
property, the VAR framework enables to decompose historical GDP series into a component driven
by the levels of the variables and a component driven by the VAR residuals. The net effect of the
fiscal shocks is isolated by subtracting from the historical resimulation a counterfactual scenario
with only GDP shocks. The estimated contributions of the discretionary policy are rather small,
mounting in normal times to about 0.1 of a percentage point in a total of 4.1 p.p.. In severe
contractions, the contributions were mostly negative, on average about -0.7 p.p. in a total of -6.5
p.p. The result that, in the periods of extreme cyclical condition discretionary policy seems to have
moved with the cycle, might be interpreted as that discretion in some of the CEE countries was
not able to lean quite effectively against the cyclical phase. Unlike the simple look at the cyclical
pattern, the decomposition takes account of the outside lags involved with the fiscal policy. In
that sense, the stimulus packages aimed at curtailing the crisis, have not immediately come to full
effect. Another reason might be of a technical nature. VAR residuals are a good approximation
of the underlying exogenous events as long as things are quite normal. However, an abnormal
drop in tax receipts, for instance, that is driven by a drastic surge in economic activity will appear
in the VAR residuals, though it was not caused by fiscal discretion. It is not straightforward to
overcome this issue simply by econometric methods. For an exact identification of the exogenous
events, detailed historical information on the budgetary process is required. Notwithstanding that,
the finding of rather small-sized contributions is in line with the previous evidence, according to
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which the effectiveness of fiscal policy in small open economies is rather low (e.g. Ilzetzki et al. ,
2013).
Table 6: Contributions of fiscal discretion to GDP growth (p.p. GDP)
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK CEE-10
Normal times
Overall GDP growth 3.8 2.5 6.0 5.8 6.4 2.2 3.9 4.1 2.1 4.4 4.1
Discretionary FP 0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
Contraction
Overall GDP growth -2.6 -4.5 -14.0 -17.8 -6.7 -6.8 1.5 -1.2 -7.9 -4.9 -6.5
Discretionary FP -0.3 -0.7 -3.7 0.1 0.2 -1.6 0.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.1 -0.7
Overheating
Overall GDP growth 6.5 6.4 10.2 10.6 8.8 3.9 6.0 7.3 7.0 8.2 7.5
Discretionary FP 0.0 1.0 0.5 -0.4 -0.1 1.9 -0.2 -0.4 0.9 0.3 0.4
Third, relationship between the volatility in fiscal discretion, which Fatas and Mihov (2003)
coined fiscal policy aggressiveness, and output volatility is examined. Figure 2 shows volatility of
the GDP growth plotted against the fiscal policy aggressiveness. Two measures of aggressiveness
are used, the standard deviation of the discretionary spending, σG , and of the structural balance,
σBAL . There are only as few as ten observations, if the standard deviations are computed one per
country. To increase the sample, additional sigmas were recursively computed moving a window of
12 quarters by 4 quarters, and of 4 quarters by 1 quarter, respectively. Given the multi-country con-
text, the underlying units to compute the standard deviations were unified by taking percentages
of the trend GDP.
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Figure 2: Fiscal aggressiveness and output volatility
Two stylised facts are observed: 1. The association between output volatility and the fiscal pol-
icy volatility is weak to moderate positive. The rank correlation coefficient amounts to 0.2-0.6 for
spending and 0.1-0.6 for the structural balance (Table 9 in the Appendix). The picture conforms
to empirical literature in the sense that it shows a positive relationship between higher output
volatility and aggressiveness of fiscal policy (cf. Fatas and Mihov, 2003; and Badinger, 2009). 2.
If also observations from downturns and overheating were to be included, the correlation coef-
ficient would drop, to about 0.1-0.6 and 0.0-0.5, respectively. This is explained by the fact that
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whilst the GDP growth was considerably more volatile during those periods, fiscal policy volatility
increased to a lesser extent (Table 7). The two findings are robust to identification method. Under
the elasticity-based identification, the correlation is positive and smaller. The finding of a lower
correlation under extreme cyclical condition would imply that at least the excess part of output
volatility had been induced by other than policy factors. Given the openness of these economies,
such non-fiscal factors might have included e.g. external demand or financial stability.
Table 7: Standard deviations in fiscal discretion and GDP growth
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK CEE-10
Normal times
σG 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03
σBAL 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04
σY 2.39 2.53 2.95 4.00 2.33 2.22 1.81 2.48 2.78 2.41 2.59
All observations
σG 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
σBAL 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
σY 3.66 3.37 6.75 8.02 6.37 3.23 2.06 4.24 4.10 3.91 4.57
5 Concluding remarks and further research
This paper analyses the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and output growth in ten
CEE countries using quarterly data over 2000q1 to 2014q1. Three aspects are put forth: cyclical
pattern in the discretionary policy, contributions to GDP growth, and the link between fiscal policy
aggressiveness and output volatility. Policy discretion is estimated from a fiscal SVAR model fol-
lowing Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that is frequently used in the macroeconomic literature. The
fiscal variables are net taxes and spending, which is motivated by their close association to aggre-
gate demand and, through aggregate demand, to output. Given the narrower base, the estimates
of structural balances presented herein are a complement rather than a fully-fledged alternative to
cyclically adjusted balances.
The literature generally favours the use of rule-based fiscal policy to policy discretion, and even
more so in emerging economies (cf. Kabashi, 2014). The empirical results from the CEE-10 in
Section 4 provide the following supportive arguments for that view:q Decomposition of the GDP suggests that fiscal discretion induced rather small contributions to
economic growth. The finding is in line with the literature that finds low effectiveness of fiscal
shocks in small open economies (e.g. Ilzetzki et al. , 2013).q Correlation between fiscal policy aggressiveness and output volatility is weak to moderate posi-
tive, notwithstanding the underlying fiscal variable, spending or balance. The result agrees with
the evidence of a positive relationship between fiscal policy volatility and output volatility from
large panel studies (e.g. Fatas and Mihov, 2003; and Badinger, 2009).q Inspection of the structural balance cyclical properties has identified a mix of pro-and counter-
cyclical episodes in the years before the crisis 2008-09. Governments might have underestimated
the cyclical phase of the economy and failed to fully utilise the best years to create buffers.
Overall, this evidence discourages from using fiscal discretion in the CEE countries with the
aim to reverse the business cycle condition. Not so much because discretionary policy, costly in
terms of fiscal sustainability, could strongly affect output, but rather the contrary. That being
said, this paper supports policy recommendations for the CEE countries expressed in the recent
literature. In particular, they could profit from transparent medium-term fiscal rules that would
enforce building up of reserves in good times and prevent the governments from running pro-
cyclical policies (e.g. Darvas and Kostyleva, 2011; and Kabashi, 2014). Appropriate fiscal rules
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should at the same time protect growth-productive spending in downturns (e.g. Klein et al. , 2013;
and Barbiero and Darvas, 2014).
In further extensions of this work, the GDP growth decomposition might focus more specifically
on public investment. A detailed break-down of the fiscal variables, combined with data on private
investment, might improve accuracy of the estimated contributions to GDP growth. As another
extension, the analysis of fiscal policy aggressiveness might include additional macroeconomic
variables, such as private GDP components or inflation (e.g. Badinger, 2009). Section 4 has shown
that correlation between policy aggressiveness and output volatility actually weakened in extreme
cyclical condition, due to a disproportionately higher GDP volatility. It would thus be worthwhile to
test on the causality between fiscal policy aggressiveness and output volatility using a theoretically
underpinned model.
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Appendix
Table 8: Annual change in CAB (p.p. potential GDP)
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK CEE-10
Normal times 0.17 0.77 n.a. 0.34 n.a. -0.32 n.a. 0.58 -0.76 0.68 0.21
Contraction -1.44 -0.68 n.a. 0.50 1.28 2.50 n.a. 3.00 0.40 -1.96 0.45
Overheating -0.41 0.47 n.a. -1.23 -1.34 -2.06 n.a. -2.00 -0.31 -0.27 -0.89
Table 9: Rank correlation between policy aggressiveness and output volatility
No transformation Moving window (12,4) Moving window (4,1)
Normal times
σG 0.60 0.22 0.18
σBAL 0.64 0.15 0.13
All observations
σG 0.56 0.08 0.14
σBAL 0.51 0.02 0.08
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